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Abstract—Unlike aerial base station enabled by a single un-
manned aerial vehicle (UAV), aerial coordinated multiple points
(CoMP) can be enabled by a UAV swarm. In this case, the
management of multiple UAVs is important. This paper considers
the power allocation strategy for a UAV swarm-enabled aerial
network, to enhance the physical layer security of the downlink
transmission, where an eavesdropper moves following the tra-
jectory of the swarm for better eavesdropping. Unlike existing
works, we use only the large-scale channel state information
(CSI) and maximize the ergodic secrecy rate (ESR) in a whole-
trajectory-oriented manner. The overall energy constraint on
each UAV is considered. The non-convexity of the formulated
problem is solved by using max-min optimization with iteration.
Both the transmission power of desired signals and artificial noise
(AN) are derived iteratively. Simulation results are presented
to validate the effectiveness of our proposed power allocation
algorithm and to show the advantage of aerial CoMP by using
only the large-scale CSI.
Index Terms—Artificial noise, ergodic secrecy rate, large-scale
fading, physical layer security, UAV swarm
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have at-
tracted great interest in wireless communications [1]–[4]. Due
to their mobility and elevated position, they can provide agile
communications [5]. With their high maneuverability, UAV
can augment the network capacity and coverage, especially
in the extreme environments without infrastructure, such as
disaster rescue, traffic monitoring and so on [1], [6]. More
specifically, UAVs are usually cost-effective [7]–[10]. They
can be exploited to assist on-demand missions, such as high-
speed data transmission in the fifth generation (5G) wireless
networks. In addition, with the huge demand in emergency
applications, i.e., public safety, delivery and surveillance,
deploying a flock of UAVs, or swarm, is becoming more
attractive, which plays a vital role in meeting performance
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requirements for communications between multiple UAVs and
5G [11]–[15].
One of the serious concerns in UAV swarm-enabled aerial
networks is how to guarantee the privacy and secrecy of the
system. Due to the broadcast nature and inherent randomness
of wireless channels, UAV swarm-enabled communication
networks are particularly vulnerable to various security threats,
such as information eavesdropping, information leakage, data
modification and so on. In addition, to facilitate the secure
transmission, the UAV swarm often places itself near the le-
gitimate users, which is beneficial to eavesdropping, especially
when the eavesdropper moves close to the legitimate users.
A. Related Work
To achieve perfect security, the conventional encryption
schemes are typically implemented at the upper layer using
cryptographic methods. However, this is often achieved at the
cost of high computational complexity [16].
Unlike the traditional cryptographic methods, physical layer
security (PLS), using the information-theoretic and signal
processing approaches, has been widely investigated in the
UAV-enabled wireless networks [17]–[20]. They enhance the
coverage and security of the wireless systems by exploiting
physical characteristics of the wireless channel. Specifically,
by adaptively adjusting the UAVs’ location, they could over-
come the propagation constraints in the cellular systems, and
provide new possibilities or opportunities for security enhance-
ment. The authors in [17] utilized UAV as a mobile relay,
and maximized the secrecy rate of the system with transmit
optimization in a four-node. In [18], the authors investigated
UAV-enabled secure communication systems where a mobile
UAV sent confidential messages to multiple ground users. By
considering the imperfect information on the locations of the
eavesdroppers, the authors in [19] investigated a UAV-ground
communication system with multiple potential eavesdroppers
on the ground. The authors in [20] considered UAV-assisted se-
cure communications between a legitimate transmitter-receiver
pair for unknown eavesdropper location by taking UAV as an
air-to-ground friendly jammer.
These studies [17]–[20] have provided insightful results for
improving the secrecy performance of the UAV-aided wireless
communications. However, they assume an ideal free-space
path-loss model [17]–[19] between the UAV and the legitimate
receivers/eavesdroppers or the instantaneous channel state in-
2formation (CSI) [20] of the eavesdroppers at the transmitter,
which may not be practical.
In practice, it is generally difficult to acquire the instan-
taneous CSI of the eavesdroppers, especially when they are
passive. To deal with that, an effective approach, named as
artificial noise(AN), has been proposed to mask the desired
signals for enhancing the secrecy performance [21]–[25],
where AN is designed based on the instantaneous CSI of the
legitimate receiver and transmitted in the null-space of the
legitimate channel. Although this scheme is helpful for the
security, it requires the perfect instantaneous CSI between the
source and the legitimate receiver at the transmitter, which
is nearly unworkable. The idea is then generalized to the
UAV-enabled wireless systems, where a UAV is applied as
a mobile jammer to transmit AN [26] or a legitimate receiver
[27]. However, these works haven’t shown useful guidelines to
improve physical layer security of UAV swarm-enabled aerial
networks.
B. Main Contributions
Despite of the above fruitful results, some challenges still
remain in the UAV swarm-enabled aerial networks.
For the UAV swarm-enabled aerial networks, an open chal-
lenge is how to acquire CSI. To practically depict the typical
propagation environments, the composite channel model, con-
sisting of both small-scale and large-scale fading, needs to
be used, which is in stark contrast to the existing literatures
[17]–[19]. Under the composite channel, one key role for the
power allocation strategy is the prior knowledge. Since it is
impossible to perfectly acquire the random small-scale fading
prior to the whole trajectory of the UAV swarm, it is almost
infeasible to assume perfect CSI. In this paper, we devote to
guarantee the secrecy performance of the system in a whole-
trajectory-oriented manner by utilizing only the large-scale
CSI of the legitimate receivers/eavesdroppers, which can be
achieved at much lower cost.
In wireless communication systems, path loss could signif-
icantly reduce the signal reception quality at the legitimate
users, especially in the UAV swarm-enabled aerial networks.
In the existing literatures, one effective scheme to overcome
the limitation is by means of multiple antenna systems, i.e.,
multiple-input single-output (MISO) [28], [29], multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) [30], [31], or single-input multiple-
output (SIMO) [32]. However, due to the limited size, it is
hard for UAVs to be equipped with multiple antennas. To
handle that, we consider an effective coordinated multiple
points (CoMP) between UAVs in this paper, where multiple
single-antenna UAVs are combined to form the UAV swarm
and then act as a virtual multiple-antenna node. Unlike the
conventional CoMP with fixed base stations (BSs), the UAV
swarm is able to cooperatively operate as an aerial CoMP by
utilizing the mobility of the UAVs. Note that, in contrast to
the existing works achieving CoMP based on perfect CSI [33],
[34], our scheme uses only the predictable large-scale CSI
between UAVs and the legitimate receivers/eavesdroppers.
The energy constraint at each UAV is another challenge
for the secrecy performance of UAV swarm-enabled aerial
networks. Since it’s generally difficult to recharge the battery
of the UAV during its flight, not only the power budget but
also the total energy constraint should be taken into account
for each UAV.
Motivated by the above observations, we investigate the
AN-aided secure transmission for the UAV swarm-enabled
aerial CoMP, where both of the legitimate receivers and eaves-
droppers are equipped with multiple antennas. Different from
the conventional eavesdropping, we assume the eavesdropper
randomly walks following the trajectory of the UAV swarm,
which may significantly deteriorate the secrecy performance of
the system. In addition, unlike the existing AN-aided secure
transmission based on the instantaneous CSI of the legitimate
users, AN in our proposed scheme is designed by using only
the large-scale CSI. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first time that studies AN-assisted secure transmission in the
UAV swarm-enabled aerial CoMP by exploiting only the large-
scale CSI of the legitimate receivers/eavesdroppers.
Our main contributions of the paper are summarized as
follows:
• We consider physical layer security in the UAV swarm-
enabled aerial networks. Specifically, multiple single-
antenna UAVs perform an aerial CoMP, and enable a vir-
tual MIMO transmission link with the multiple-antenna
legitimate receivers or the eavesdropper, in which the
swarm transmits the confidential messages in conjunction
with AN and sequentially hovers to serve the scheduled
legitimate users. Unlike the existing wiretap mode where
the eavesdropper keeps static at a fixed location, we con-
sider the eavesdropper moves following the trajectory of
the swarm for better eavesdropping in a passive manner.
• To characterize the typical propagation environments, we
consider a practical composite channel model consisting
of both small-scale and large-scale fading. However, it
is infeasible to achieve perfect CSI since the small-scale
channel fading is time-varying and hard to be acquired.
In this work, we use only the large-scale channel fading,
which is more reasonable because the large-scale channel
fading mainly depends on the position information of
both the UAV and the legitimate receivers/eavesdroppers.
We can obtain such information based on the historical
data and the related distance between the UAV and the
legitimate receivers/eavesdroppers.
• An optimization framework in a whole-trajectory-
oriented manner is proposed to maximize the ergodic
secrecy rate (ESR) by jointly optimizing the power allo-
cation between the confidential messages and AN under
the overall energy budget at each UAV. The formulated
problem is not convex and hard to be solved directly.
To handle that, an equivalent max-min problem is re-
formulated, and then an efficient iterative algorithm is
proposed. Specifically, the problem is split into three
subproblems. For the first two subproblems, they are
convex and can be solved using the general optimization
toolbox. For the last subproblem, we first transform its
3non-convex behavior into the convex one by adopting a
successive convex approximation technique. Then, these
three subproblems are alternately updated in each itera-
tion. Furthermore, we show that the proposed algorithm
guarantees the convergence. Finally, simulation results
validate that our proposed scheme could achieve a good
secrecy performance.
C. Organization and Notations
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the system model and problem formulation. Section
III proposes power allocation for secure aerial CoMP. In
Section IV, simulation results and discussions are presented.
Finally, conclusions are made in Section VI.
Throughout this paper, upper case and lower case boldface
letters represent the matrices and the vectors, respectively. IL
is an L × L identity matrix, and 0 is a zero vector. E(·)
denotes the expectation operation. (·)H and Tr(·) represent the
conjugate transpose and the trace of a matrix, respectively.
A  0 denotes that A is a positive semidefinite matrix.
y ∼ N (0, a) denotes the Gaussian random variable with mean
0 and variance a. x ∼ CN (s,Σ) is the complex circularly
symmetric Gaussian distribution with the mean vector s and
the covariance matrix Σ.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
We consider the downlink transmission in the UAV swarm-
enabled aerial networks. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the system
consists of L UAVs (indexed with 1, ..., L), N legitimate users
(indexed with 1, ..., N ) as Bob, and one eavesdropper as Eve.
All the legitimate users and the eavesdropper are equipped
with NB and NE antennas, respectively. For the UAVs, they
form a UAV swarm via CoMP, and act as the aerial base station
to assist the wireless networks.
Due to the limited weight and size, only one single antenna
is equipped at each UAV. The swarm flies above the coverage
area of the legitimate users. In this paper, we assume the
same consecutive period, denoting as TU , for each UAV
in the swarm, which mainly consists of two parts: flying
duration and transmission duration. Here, we assume only
during the transmission duration could the UAV swarm hover
to serve the legitimate receivers. Furthermore, each legitimate
receiver is assumed to be served at most once during the
consecutive period. Denote the transmission durations for N
legitimate users as τ1, τ2,...,τN , respectively. For simplicity,
suppose that the transmission durations are the same, i.e.,
τi = τ, i = 1, ..., N
1.
In addition, suppose that the coordinate of the lth UAV in
the nth transmission duration is (wl[n], sl[n], hl[n])
2, where
1 The assumption of the equal transmission duration for each legitimate user
may not be quite practical. In fact, the transmission duration should also be
optimally allocated during the UAV flying period [35]. However, it is out of
the scope.
2 The expression is slightly different from the existing ones [3], [17], in which
n represents the nth time slot.
(wl[n], sl[n]) and hl[n] denote the horizontal coordinate and
the altitude of the lth UAV, respectively.
Over the flight of the UAV swarm, all the legitimate users
could be provided with the confidential messages once they
are scheduled 3. Due to the openness of the wireless link,
there exists a leakage of the confidential messages. In this
system, we assume the eavesdropper is passive and only
intends for the confidential messages which are transmitted to
the scheduled legitimate users. Furthermore, the eavesdropper
randomly moves following the specific trajectory of the swarm
to improve eavesdropping. Meanwhile, the eavesdropper also
tries to keep a safe distance from the scheduled legitimate
users so that it could not be spotted.
We denote the coordinate of the scheduled legitimate
user/eavesdropper in the nth transmission duration as
(rq[n], tq[n], 0), where q ∈ {B,E}. The locations of the
legitimate users/eavesdropper are assumed to be known by the
UAV swarm for transmission resource allocation. Thus, the
distance between the lth UAV and q at the nth transmission
duration is
dq,l[n]
=
√
(hl[n])2 +
(
wl[n]− rq[n]
)2
+
(
sl[n]− tq [n]
)2
, q ∈ {B,E}.
(1)
To be practical, we consider both line-of-sight (LoS) and
non-line-of-sight (NLoS) connections between the UAVs and
the legitimate users. Therefore, the large-scale path loss be-
tween the lth UAV and q at the nth transmission duration can
be modeled as [36]
PLdBq,l [n] =
A
1 + ae−b(ρq,l[n]−a)
+Bq,l[n], (2)
where
A = ηLoS − ηNLoS,
Bq,l[n] = 20lg(dq,l[n]) + 20lg(
4πf
c
) + ηNLoS,
ρq,l[n] =
180
π
arcsin
(
hl[n]
dq,l[n]
)
,
ηLoS, ηNLoS, a and b are constants related to the propagation
environment, f is the carrier frequency, and c is the speed of
light [36].
Consequently, the absolute power loss between the lth UAV
and q at the nth transmission duration can be expressed as:
Qq,l[n] = 10
PLdB
q,l
[n]
10 . (3)
The channel from the lth UAV to q at the nth transmission
duration can be rewritten as
hq,l[n] = Q
− 12
q,l [n]sq,l[n], (4)
where sq,l[n] ∈ C
Nq×1 represents the small-scale fading
between the lth UAV and q, of which the entries are indepen-
dently and identically distributed (i.i.d) according to CN (0, 1).
In order to degrade the eavesdropper’s channel, each UAV
3 In fact, the user scheduling issue is important for the system. However, it
is out of the scope of this work.
4Fig. 1. Illustration of a UAV swarm-enabled aerial network, where a UAV swarm, acting as an aerial CoMP, enables MIMO secure communications with the
multiple-antenna legitimate users and the eavesdropper in a whole-trajectory-oriented manner. Specifically, the swarm hovers to serve the scheduled legitimate
users only in the transmission duration, and the eavesdropper wiretaps the confidential messages by moving following the trajectory of the UAV swarm.
transmits the confidential message in conjunction with AN.
Denoting xl[n] as the transmission signal from the lth UAV to
the scheduled legitimate user at the nth transmission duration,
we have
xl[n] = x
s
l [n] + x
a
l [n], (5)
where xsl [n] and x
a
l [n] represent the confidential message and
AN from the lth UAV, respectively.
Furthermore, we express the transmission power from the
lth UAV to the scheduled legitimate user at the nth transmis-
sion duration as
E{|xl[n]|
2} = psl [n] + p
a
l [n], (6)
where E{|xsl [n]|
2} = psl [n], E{|x
a
l [n]|
2} = pal [n], p
s
l [n] and
pal [n] denote the power of the confidential message and that of
the artificial noise transmitted by the lth UAV for the scheduled
legitimate user at the nth transmission duration, respectively.
Since each UAV has the limited power, we have
0 ≤ psl [n] + p
a
l [n] ≤ P
max, ∀l, n (7)
where (7) represents the transmission power constraint and
Pmax is the transmission power budget of each UAV.
Considering the energy limitation of the UAVs within the
flying period, the following constraint is achieved
N∑
n=1
(psl [n] + p
a
l [n])τn ≤ E
max, ∀l (8)
where (8) denotes the total energy constraint at each UAV over
the whole flight, and Emax is the energy budget per UAV.
Based on the aforementioned analysis, all the UAVs work
together to transmit the confidential messages for the legit-
imate users, which could form a virtual Nq × L MIMO
communication link. Note that to avoid the collision, we
assume the UAVs are restricted to fly following their specific
trajectory with a minimum safety distance between them. In
this case, the composite channel matrix Hq[n] ∈ CNq×L
between the swarm and q at the nth transmission duration
can be expressed as
Hq[n] = Sq[n]Qq[n], q ∈ {B,E} (9)
where
Hq[n] =
[
hq,1[n],hq,2[n], ...,hq,L[n]
]
,
Sq[n] =
[
sq,1[n], sq,2[n], ..., sq,L[n]
]
,
Qq[n] =


Q
− 12
q,1 [n]
. . .
Q
− 12
q,L[n]

 .
The received signal at the scheduled legitimate user, de-
noting yB [n], in the nth transmission duration, and that at
the corresponding eavesdropper, denoting yE [n], in the nth
transmission duration are given by
yB[n] = HB[n]
(
xs[n] + xa[n]
)
+ nB[n], (10)
yE [n] = HE [n]
(
xs[n] + xa[n]
)
+ nE [n], (11)
respectively, where xs[n] ∼ CN (0,Ps[n]) and xa[n] ∼
CN (0,Pa[n]) denote the confidential messages and AN trans-
mitted by the UAV swarm at the nth transmission duration
54, respectively, and Ps[n] and Pa[n] are their covariance
matrices, respectively. nB [n] ∼ CN (0, δ
2INB ) and nE [n] ∼
CN (0, δ2INE ) denote the noise vector at the scheduled le-
gitimate user and the eavesdropper at the nth transmission
duration, respectively, and δ2 represents the noise variance 5.
B. Problem Formulation
In this subsection, we focus on the problem formulation for
this system. Based on (10), the achievable ergodic rate for the
scheduled legitimate user at the nth transmission duration is
given by
RB[n] =ESB [n]
[
log2 det
(
INB +HB[n]Ps[n](HB[n])
H
×
(
HB[n]Pa[n](HB[n])
H + δ2INB
)−1)]
,
(12)
where ESB [n](·) is taken over the random small-scale fading
realization of SB[n],
Ps[n] =


ps1[n]
. . .
psL[n]

 , (13)
and
Pa[n] =


pa1 [n]
. . .
paL[n]

 . (14)
Based on (11), the achievable ergodic rate for the eaves-
dropper who is intended for the confidential message of the
scheduled legitimate user at the nth transmission duration is
RE [n] =ESE [n]
[
log2 det
(
INE +HE [n]Ps[n](HE [n])
H
×
(
HE[n]Pa[n](HE [n])
H + δ2INE
)−1)]
,
(15)
where ESE [n](·) is taken over the random small-scale fading
realization of SE [n].
Denote Φs = {Ps[n], ∀n} and Φa = {Pa[n], ∀n}. Then,
the ergodic secrecy rate for the UAV swarm-enabled aerial
networks is defined as [39]
R
(
Φs,Φa
)
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
RB [n]−RE [n]
]+
, (16)
where [x]+ = max(0, x).
4 Different from the existing literatures [37], [38], AN in this work is designed
by using only the large-scale CSI instead of the instantaneous legitimate CSI.
Owing to the broadcast nature of the wireless channel, AN unavoidably has
a leakage and harms the legitimate receivers. Thus, it’s important to carefully
design the power allocation between the confidential messages and AN so
as to minimize the harmful effect on the legitimate users while jamming the
eavesdropper, which would be presented in details in the following.
5 Here, we assume the noise variance is the same, i.e., equal to δ2 , over the
flying period. For convenience, we drop n here.
In this work, our goal is to maximize the ergodic secrecy
rate over the flying period of the UAV swarm by jointly opti-
mizing the power of the confidential messages (i.e., Φs) and
AN power (i.e., Φa) under the constraint of the energy budget
for each UAV. The optimization problem can be formulated as
max
Φs,Φa
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
RB[n]−RE [n]
]+
(17a)
s.t. 0 ≤ psl [n] + p
a
l [n] ≤ P
max, ∀l, n (17b)
N∑
n=1
(psl [n] + p
a
l [n])τn ≤ E
max, ∀l (17c)
Ps[n]  0, ∀n, (17d)
Pa[n]  0, ∀n. (17e)
It can be observed that problem (17) is challenging to be
solved for two reasons. First, the operator [·]+ results in a
nonsmooth manner. Second, even without [·]+, the objective
function (17a) has integrals with the expectation operator
E(·), which is intractable and difficult to achieve an explicit
expression in terms of Φs and Φa.
III. POWER ALLOCATION FOR SECURE AERIAL COMP
In this section, we devote our effort to achieve the optimal
solutions of problem (17). Before the further analysis, we first
handle the nonsmooth of the objective function in problem
(17) by adopting the similar analysis in [19], which can be
reformulated into
max
Φs,Φa
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
RB[n]−RE [n]
]
(18a)
s.t. 0 ≤ psl [n] + p
a
l [n] ≤ P
max, ∀l, n (18b)
N∑
n=1
(psl [n] + p
a
l [n])τn ≤ E
max, ∀l (18c)
Ps[n]  0, ∀n, (18d)
Pa[n]  0, ∀n, (18e)
where problem (18) and problem (17) share the same optimal
solution.
To achieve the efficient power allocation, an explicit expres-
sion of the objective function in (18) is necessary. Although
some works have provided an insightful result to obtain the
analytical expression for the objective function, it is generally
too cumbersome to do the further power allocation design
since the analytical result involves a series of integrals [40].
In the following, we first achieve the closed form of the
ergodic secrecy rate in terms of Φs and Φa by removing the
expectation operator E(·) based on [41]. Then, we reformulate
the optimization problem. Finally, a computationally efficient
iterative algorithm is proposed for the problem and its conver-
gence is presented.
6G(Φs,Φa, tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a)
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
g
(
Pu[n], NB,QB[n], tB,u[n]
)
− g
(
Pa[n], NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]
)
− g
(
Pu[n], NE ,QE[n], tE,u[n]
)
+ g
(
Pa[n], NE,QE [n], tE,a[n]
)]
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
{[
log2 det
(
IL +
NBQB[n]Pu[n]QB[n]
δ2etB,u[n]
)
+NB log2 e
(
tB,u[n]− 1 + e
−tB,u[n]
)]
−
[
log2 det
(
IL +
NBQB[n]Pa[n]QB[n]
δ2etB,a[n]
)
+NB log2 e
(
tB,a[n]− 1 + e
−tB,a[n]
)]
−
[
log2 det
(
IL +
NEQE [n]Pu[n]QE [n]
δ2etE,u[n]
)
+NE log2 e
(
tE,u[n]− 1 + e
−tE,u[n]
)]
+
[
log2 det
(
IL +
NEQE [n]Pa[n]QE[n]
δ2etE,a[n]
)
+NE log2 e
(
tE,a[n]− 1 + e
−tE,a[n]
)]}
.
(21)
A. Problem Transformation
Denoting Pu[n] = Ps[n] +Pa[n], ∀n, the ergodic secrecy
rate R
(
Φs,Φa
)
can be equivalently rewritten as
R
(
Φs,Φa
)
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
ESB [n]
[
log2 det
(
INB +
HB [n]Pu[n](HB [n])
H
δ2
)]
− ESB [n]
[
log2 det
(
INB +
HB [n]Pa[n](HB [n])
H
δ2
)]
− ESE [n]
[
log2 det
(
INE +
HE [n]Pu[n](HE [n])
H
δ2
)]
+ ESE [n]
[
log2 det
(
INE +
HE [n]Pa[n](HE [n])
H
δ2
)]]
.
(19)
It can be observed that (19) is still intractable due to the expec-
tation operator E(·). To cope with that, we try to approximate
(19) by introducing the following theorem.
Theorem 1. By introducing auxiliary variables tB,u =
{tB,u[n], ∀n}, tE,a = {tE,a[n], ∀n}, tB,a = {tB,a[n], ∀n},
tE,u = {tE,u[n], ∀n}, R
(
Φs,Φa
)
can be equivalently ex-
pressed as
R
as
(
Φs,Φa
)
= max
tB,a≥0,tE,u≥0,
min
tB,u≥0,tE,a≥0,
G(Φs,Φa, tB,u, tB,a,
tE,u, tE,a),
(20)
where G(Φs,Φa, tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a) is defined in (21).
Furthermore, G(Φs,Φa, tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a) is convex in
terms of (tB,u, tE,a), and concave with respect to (tB,a, tE,u).
Proof. Please refer to Appendix A. 
Note that the performance gap between R
(
Φs,Φa
)
and
Ras
(
Φs,Φa
)
can be negligible according to [41], which
denotes Ras
(
Φs,Φa
)
is a quite accurate approximation for
R
(
Φs,Φa
)
. In this case, the optimization problem (18) can
be reformulated as
max
Φs,Φa,
tB,a, tE,u
min
tB,u, tE,a
G(Φs,Φa, tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a) (22a)
s.t. (18b), (18c), (18d), (18e), (22b)
tB,a ≥ 0, tE,u ≥ 0, (22c)
tB,u ≥ 0, tE,a ≥ 0. (22d)
B. An Iterative Algorithm to Solve the Problem
In this subsection, we propose an efficient iterative algo-
rithm to achieve the optimal solutions of problem (22). We
first decouple the optimization variables into the following
three blocks (tB,u, tE,a), (tB,a, tE,u), (Φs,Φa), and then
alternately optimize these three blocks one by one by taking
the other variables as the constants obtained in the last
iteration. Specifically, for any given power indicators (Φs,
Φa), the auxiliary variables (tB,u, tE,a) (or (tB,a, tE,u)) can
be efficiently solved through standard algorithm [42]. For any
obtained auxiliary variables (tB,a, tE,u) and (tB,u, tE,a), the
power indicators (Φs, Φa) can be optimized by the successive
convex approximation technique.
Denote m ≥ 1 as the number of the iteration step. Problem
(22) can be separated into the following three subproblems.
(1) The optimal variables (tB,u, tE,a)
In the mth iteration, we first optimize (tB,u, tE,a) with
(Φm−1s ,Φ
m−1
a ) obtained in the m−1th iteration. In this case,
problem (22) can be reformulated into
min
tB,u,tE,a
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
g
(
Pm−1u [n], NB,QB[n], tB,u[n]
)
(23a)
+ g
(
Pm−1a [n], NE ,QE[n], tE,a[n]
)]
s.t. tB,u ≥ 0, tE,a ≥ 0. (23b)
Based on Theorem 1, we know that problem (23) is convex,
which can be efficiently solved by means of the standard
optimization toolbox, i.e., CVX.
7(2) The optimal variables (tB,a, tE,u)
Based on the obtained (Φm−1s ,Φ
m−1
a ) in the m − 1th
iteration, the variables (tB,a, tE,u) can be achieved by
min
tB,a,tE,u
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
g
(
Pm−1a [n], NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]
)
(24a)
+ g
(
Pm−1u [n], NE ,QE[n], tE,u[n]
)]
s.t. tB,a ≥ 0, tE,u ≥ 0. (24b)
which is convex and can be directly solved using CVX.
(3) The optimal variables (Φs,Φa)
In the last step of the mth iteration, the variables (Φs,Φa)
with the obtained (tmB,u, t
m
E,a) and (t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u) can be
achieved by solving the following problem
max
Φs,Φa
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
g
(
Pu[n], NB,QB[n], t
m
B,u[n]
)
(25a)
− g
(
Pa[n], NB,QB[n], t
m
B,a[n]
)
− g
(
Pu[n], NE,QE [n], t
m
E,u[n]
)
+ g
(
Pa[n], NE ,QE [n], t
m
E,a[n]
)]
s.t. (18b), (18c), (18d), (18e). (25b)
Note that both g
(
Pu[n], NB,QB[n], t
m
B,u[n]
)
and
g
(
Pu[n], NE ,QE [n], t
m
E,u[n]
)
are concave with respect
to Pu[n], and both g
(
Pa[n], NB,QB[n], t
m
B,a[n]
)
and
g
(
Pa[n], NE ,QE[n], t
m
E,a[n]
)
are concave with respect to
Pa[n] [41]. Thus, the objective function in (25) actually
mixes the addition and subtraction of these four concave
terms, which is neither concave with respect to Φs nor
concave with respect to Φa. That is, problem (25) is not
convex in terms of Φs and Φa.
To overcome the convexity issue, we approximate the sec-
ond and the third terms of the objective function in (25) to an
affine function based on the first-order Taylor expansion.
The gradient of g
(
Pa[n], NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]
)
6 can be
rewritten as
∇Pa[n] g
(
Pa[n], NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]
)
=ϕB,a[n]QB[n]
(
IL + ϕB,a[n]QB[n]Pa[n]QB[n]
)−1
QB[n]
,F(Pa[n], NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]),
(26)
where ϕB,a[n] =
NB
δ2e
tB,a[n]
. Thus, the first-order Taylor
expansion of g
(
Pa[n], NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]
)
at a certain point
P˜a[n] can be expressed as
g
(
Pa[n], NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]
∣∣P˜a[n])
=g
(
P˜a[n], NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]
)
+ tr
[
F
(
P˜a[n], NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]
)(
Pa[n]− P˜a[n]
)]
,
(27)
where g
(
P˜a[n], NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]
)
= g
(
Pa[n], NB,
QB[n], tB,a[n]
)
|
Pa[n]=P˜a[n]
. Clearly, g
(
Pa[n], NB,QB[n],
tB,a[n]|P˜a[n]
)
is a linear function with respect to Pa[n].
6 For convenience, we drop m.
Similarly, the gradient of g
(
Pu[n], NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]
)
can
be rewritten as
∇Pu[n] g
(
Pu[n], NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]
)
=ϕE,u[n]QE [n]
(
IL + ϕE,u[n]QE[n]Pu[n]QE [n]
)−1
QE [n]
,F(Pu[n], NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]),
(28)
where ϕE,u[n] =
NE
δ2e
tE,u[n]
. Thus, the first-order Taylor
expansion of g
(
Pu[n], NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]
)
at a certain point
P˜u[n] can be expressed as
g
(
Pu[n], NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]
∣∣P˜u[n])
=g
(
P˜u[n], NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]
)
+ tr
[
F
(
P˜u[n], NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]
)(
Pu[n]− P˜u[n]
)]
,
(29)
where g
(
P˜u[n], NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]
)
= g
(
Pu[n], NE ,
QE [n], tE,u[n]
)
|
Pu[n]=P˜u[n]
. Clearly, g
(
Pu[n], NE,QE [n],
tE,u[n]|P˜u[n]
)
is a linear function in terms of Pu[n].
In this case, problem (25) in the mth iteration can be recast
into
max
Φs,Φa
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
g
(
Pu[n], NB,QB[n], t
m
B,u[n]
)
(30a)
− g
(
Pa[n], NB,QB[n], t
m
B,a[n]
∣∣Pm−1a [n])
− g
(
Pu[n], NE,QE [n], t
m
E,u[n]
∣∣Pm−1u [n])
+ g
(
Pa[n], NE ,QE [n], t
m
E,a[n]
)]
s.t. (18b), (18c), (18d), (18e). (30b)
Problem (30) is convex in terms of Φs and Φa. Therefore,
the optimal variables (Φs,Φa) can be solved by utilizing the
standard optimization toolbox CVX.
Based on the above analysis, an overall iterative algorithm
for problem (17) can be achieved. Specifically, in each itera-
tion, the original problem (17) can be optimized by alternately
solving problem (23), problem (24) and problem (25) in an
iterative manner. The details of the proposed algorithm can be
summarized in Algorithm 1.
C. Convergence Performance Analysis
Based on the analysis in Section III-B, we could achieve an
approximation of G(Φs,Φa, tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a) as shown
in (31). Recall that any concave function is upper bounded by
its first-order Taylor expansion at a given local point [43]. The
following upper-bounded expressions hold
g
(
Pa[n], NB ,QB [n], tB,a[n]
)
≤g
(
Pa[n], NB ,QB [n], tB,a[n]
∣∣P˜a[n]) (32)
and
g
(
Pu[n], NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]
)
≤g
(
Pu[n], NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]
∣∣P˜u[n]), (33)
where the equalities in (32) and (33) are met when Pa[n] =
P˜a[n] and Pu[n] = P˜u[n], respectively.
8G¯
[
Φs,Φa, tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a
∣∣(Φ˜s, Φ˜a)]
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
g
(
Pu[n], NB ,QB [n], tB,u[n]
)
− g
(
Pa[n], NB ,QB [n], tB,a[n]|P˜a [n]
)
− g
(
Pu[n], NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]|P˜u[n]
)
+ g
(
Pa[n], NE ,QE [n], tE,a[n]
)]
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
{[
log2 det
(
IL +
NBQB [n]Pu[n]QB [n]
δ2etB,u[n]
)
+NB log2 e
(
tB,u[n]− 1 + e
−tB,u[n]
)]
−
[
log2 det
(
IL +
NBQB [n]P˜a[n]QB [n]
δ2etB,a[n]
)
+NB log2 e
(
tB,a[n]− 1 + e
−tB,a[n]
)
+
log2 eNB
δ2etB,a[n]
tr
([
QB [n]
(
IL +
NB
δ2etB,a[n]
QB [n]P˜a[n]QB [n]
)−1
QB [n]
](
Pa[n]− P˜a[n]
))]
−
[
log2 det
(
IL +
NEQE [n]P˜u[n]QE [n]
δ2etE,u[n]
)
+NE log2 e
(
tE,u[n]− 1 + e
−tE,u[n]
)
+
log2 eNE
δ2etE,u[n]
tr
([
QE [n]
(
IL +
NE
δ2etE,u[n]
QE [n]P˜u[n]QE [n]
)−1
QE [n]
](
Pu[n]− P˜u[n]
))]
+
[
log2 det
(
IL +
NEQE [n]Pa[n]QE [n]
δ2etE,a[n]
)
+NE log2 e
(
tE,a[n]− 1 + e
−tE,a[n]
)]}
.
(31)
Algorithm 1 The proposed iterative algorithm for solving
problem (17)
1: Initialize: the power of the confidential messages
Φ0s =
[
P0s[1], ...,P
0
s[N ]
]
, the AN power Φ0a =[
P0a[1], ...,P
0
a[N ]
]
and the accuracy ǫ > 0. Set m = 0.
2: repeat
3: Obtain the optimal set (tmB,u, t
m
E,a) by solving problem
(23) with the obtained set (Φm−1s ,Φ
m−1
a ),
4: Obtain the optimal set (tmB,a, t
m
E,u) by solving problem
(24) with the obtained set (Φm−1s ,Φ
m−1
a ),
5: Obtain the optimal set (Φms ,Φ
m
a ) by solving problem
(25) with the obtained set (tmB,u, t
m
E,a) and (t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u).
6: m− 1← m.
7: until The fractional increase of the objective function is
below the threshold ǫ > 0.
Thus, we could achieve
G(Φs,Φa, tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a)
≥G¯
[
Φs,Φa, tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a
∣∣(Φ˜s, Φ˜a)], (34)
where the equality holds when Φs = Φ˜s and Φa = Φ˜a.
Based on the fact (34), we present the convergence of
Algorithm 1, as shown next. In the mth iteration, the optimal
solutions (Φms , Φ
m
a ), (t
m
B,u, t
m
E,a) and (t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u) can be
obtained by Algorithm 1. Based on the properties of the saddle
point [42], the following relationship in themth iteration holds
G¯
[
Φ
m
s ,Φ
m
a , t
m
B,u, t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u, t
m
E,a
∣∣(Φ˜m−1s , Φ˜m−1a )]
≥G¯
[
Φs,Φa, t
m
B,u, t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u, t
m
E,a
∣∣(Φ˜m−1s , Φ˜m−1a )]. (35)
Let Φs = Φ
m−1
s and Φa = Φ
m−1
a . Then, it follows from
(35) that
G¯
[
Φ
m
s ,Φ
m
a , t
m
B,u, t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u, t
m
E,a
∣∣(Φ˜m−1s , Φ˜m−1a )]
≥G¯
[
Φ
m−1
s ,Φ
m−1
a , t
m
B,u, t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u, t
m
E,a
∣∣(Φ˜m−1s , Φ˜m−1a )]
=G(Φm−1s ,Φ
m−1
a , t
m
B,u, t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u, t
m
E,a).
(36)
According to (20), we know that 7
R
as
(
Φ
m
s ,Φ
m
a
)
= max
tB,a,tE,u,
min
tB,u,tE,a,
G(Φms ,Φ
m
a , tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a)
(a)
= min
tB,u,tE,a,
G(Φms ,Φ
m
a , tB,u, t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u, tE,a)
(b)
≥ min
tB,u,tE,a,
G¯
[
Φ
m
s ,Φ
m
a , tB,u, t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u, tE,a
∣∣(Φ˜m−1s , Φ˜m−1a )],
(37)
where step (a) holds since (tmB,a, t
m
E,u) are the optimal
solutions by using Algorithm 1, and step (b) holds due to
the first-order Taylor expansion as shown in (34).
Furthermore, we have
G¯
[
Φ
m
s ,Φ
m
a , t
m
B,u, t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u, t
m
E,a
∣∣(Φ˜m−1s , Φ˜m−1a )]
= min
tB,u,tE,a,
G¯
[
Φ
m
s ,Φ
m
a , tB,u, t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u, tE,a
∣∣(Φ˜m−1s , Φ˜m−1a )].
(38)
Thus, according to (20), (36), (37) and (38), it follows that
R
as
(
Φ
m
s ,Φ
m
a
)
≥G¯
[
Φ
m
s ,Φ
m
a , t
m
B,u, t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u, t
m
E,a
∣∣(Φ˜m−1s , Φ˜m−1a )]
≥G(Φm−1s ,Φ
m−1
a , t
m
B,u, t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u, t
m
E,a)
(c)
= max
tB,a,tE,u,
min
tB,u,tE,a,
G(Φm−1s ,Φ
m−1
a , tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a)
(d)
=Ras
(
Φ
m−1
s ,Φ
m−1
a
)
,
(39)
where step (c) holds since (tB,u, tE,a) and (tB,a, tE,u) are the
optimal solutions in Algorithm 1, and step (d) holds according
to the closed form of the ergodic secrecy rate in (20).
(39) indicates that Ras
(
Φs,Φa
)
is nondecreasing in each
7 Due to the limited space, we simplify the constraint tq,x ≥ 0 as tq,x,
where q ∈ {B, E} and x ∈ {u, a}.
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Fig. 2. Ergodic secrecy rate based on different transmission strategies.
iteration, which can assure the convergence of Algorithm 1.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, the performance of our proposed scheme
is verified by simulation. We consider a 1000m × 1000m
square cell, and suppose there are N = 3 legitimate receivers
which are randomly distributed in the cell 8. The multiple
single-antenna UAVs are randomly dispatched in the circular
of radius 50m with altitude 100m ∼ 200m, and fly above
the coverage area of the scheduled legitimate users. The
eavesdropper locates with a safety distance 100m away from
the scheduled legitimate user to hide himself, and moves
following the trajectory of the UAV swarm for better eaves-
dropping. Unless otherwise specified, the system parameters
are set as follows: the number of antennas for the legitimate
users NB = 4, the number of antennas for the eavesdropper
NE = 2, the transmission duration τ = 4s, f = 2.4GHz [4],
c = 3 × 108m/s, a = 5.0188, b = 0.3511 [36] and the noise
covariance δ2 = −107dBm [41]. The threshold presented in
Algorithm 1 is fixed as ǫ = 10−3. We consider the typical
propagation environments using the following (ηLoS, ηNLoS)
pairs (0.1, 21), (1.0, 20), (1.6, 23), (2.3, 34) corresponding to
suburban, urban, dense urban, and highrise urban, respectively
[36].
To depict the performance of the proposed scheme, we
compare it with the existing scheme in Fig. 2. We assume
P0s[n] = p¯sIL, ∀n, where p¯s = 24dBm, P
0
a[n] = p¯aIL, ∀n,
where p¯a = 4dBm, E
max = 500J and do the simulation for 10
randomly-generated realizations in the suburban environment.
In the existing scheme, confidential messages are transmitted
for the legitimate receivers by UAVs, and AN is transmitted
in the null space of the legitimate channel according to the
instantaneous CSI HB via precoding. Similar to [38], we con-
sider the power allocation between the desired signals and AN,
where the ratio φ = NB
NE+NB
of the power budget is allocated
to the desired signals, and the ratio 1− φ is allocated to AN.
Note that, this scheme has been widely investigated in the
existing literatures but the large-scale CSI has not been taken
into account. From the simulation results, we can observe that
the proposed scheme presents a significant performance gain
8 This work can be generalized into more legitimate receivers (N > 3).
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Fig. 3. Convergence of the proposed algorithm.
over the existing scheme in the case L = 4 and 6, which can
be explained as follows. In our proposed scheme, the UAV
swarm could adaptively transmit the confidential messages in
a higher power when it is close to the legitimate users based
on the large-scale CSI, and allocate the higher power for AN
when the swarm is close to the eavesdropper, which promotes
the secrecy performance improvement. However, due to the
inflexible signal transmission mode in the existing scheme, the
confidential messages and AN are transmitted in orthogonal
channel spaces. Although the eavesdropper can be well sup-
pressed by exploiting AN, it is not able to improve receiving
quality of the legitimate receivers with the fixed power of
the desired signals. Therefore, a poor secrecy performance is
achieved.
To further illustrate the convergence of Algorithm 1, we
present the convergence process for 100 randomly-generated
system topologies by the proposed Algorithm 1 in the subur-
ban environment in Fig. 3. We initialize P0s[n] = p¯sIL, ∀n,
where p¯s = 20dBm, P
0
a[n] = p¯aIL, ∀n, where p¯a = 0dBm,
the power constraint Pmax = 35dBm, and the energy con-
straint Emax = 500J. It can be observed that for the most
cases, Algorithm 1 can converge within 5 iterations, which
demonstrates the validity of the proposed scheme.
Fig. 4 illustrates ESR by Algorithm 1 versus different power
budget for each UAV in the suburban scenario. We assume
P0s[n] = p¯sIL, ∀n, where p¯s = 24dBm, P
0
a[n] = p¯aIL, ∀n,
where p¯a = 4dBm, E
max = 500J, and achieve ESR based on
10 randomly-generated system topologies. From Fig. 4, we
can see that ESR increases when the power budget for each
UAV becomes large. That is due to the fact that the increasing
transmission power can enhance the achievable ergodic rate
at the legitimate user or the eavesdropper. Furthermore, in
our proposed scheme, the confidential message and AN are
transmitted independently without cooperation at each UAV.
Based on the large-scale CSI, each UAV could allocate more
power to the confidential message to improve the achievable
rate of Bob when the UAV swarm is close to the legitimate
users. When the swarm is close to Eve, more power would
be allocated to AN for decreasing the signal receiving quality
of Eve. Also, for the same power budget of each UAV, ESR
increases as the number of UAVs in the swarm. Obviously,
the larger the number of UAVs is, the higher the power of
the confidential messages is, which significantly enhances the
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secrecy performance of the system.
Fig. 5 depicts ESR achieved by Algorithm 1 versus total
energy budget for each UAV in the suburban scenario, which is
derived based on 10 randomly-selected system topologies. It is
assumed that P0s[n] = p¯sIL, ∀n, where p¯s = 10dBm, P
0
a[n] =
p¯aIL, ∀n, where p¯a = 17dBm, and Pmax = 35dBm. From
Fig. 5, it can be seen that ESR increases as the total energy
constraint for each UAV becomes large. That is because when
the energy budget at each UAV increases, the transmission
power at each UAV is getting large over its flight. By using
the large-scale CSI, the power of the confidential messages and
the AN power can be intelligently designed. More power can
be transmitted for the confidential messages when the swarm
is close to Bob, and more power is allocated for AN when the
swarm is near to Eve. Thus, a positive ESR can be achieved.
Furthermore, we can also see that at the same energy budget
of each UAV, ESR grows with the increasing number of UAVs
in the swarm. That is due to the fact that as the number of
UAVs increases, the total energy of the UAV swarm is getting
high. In this case, ESR could increase.
Fig. 6 presents ESR obtained by Algorithm 1 versus the
total energy budget for each UAV in different urban scenarios.
Here, we achieve ESR based on 10 randomly-generated system
topologies. We specify the initial transmission power P0s[n] =
p¯sIL, ∀n, where p¯s = 25dBm, P0a[n] = p¯aIL, ∀n, where p¯a =
5dBm. It can be observed that ESR is various in the different
propagation environments. That comes from that the power
loss is highly dependent on the practical urban environments
[36], which leads to the divergence of ESR. Also, it can be
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different typical environments.
seen that as the total energy budget for each UAV becomes
large, ESR increases. Furthermore, ESR in the case L = 6 is
larger than that in the case L = 4. That is because that the
total energy of the UAV swarm increases with the number of
UAVs, which leads to the higher ESR.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated power allocation of AN-assist
secure transmission for the UAV swarm-enabled aerial CoMP,
where the eavesdropper moved following the trajectory of
the swarm for better eavesdropping. We took the composite
channel including small-scale and large-scale fading into ac-
count. Considering the hardness in acquiring the perfect CSI,
we maximized ESR by utilizing only the large-scale CSI of
the legitimate receivers and the eavesdropper. Specifically, we
designed the problem by jointly optimizing the transmission
power of the desired signals and the AN power under the
energy constraint of each UAV during its flying period. The
formulated problem was a non-convex one. To handle that,
we first achieved a closed form of ESR, and then provided an
iterative algorithm for the problem. Finally, we evaluated the
effectiveness of our proposed iterative algorithm by means of
simulation results.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Considering the identical structure of four terms in (19),
we focus on the first term and denote it as fB,u(Φs,Φa) =
1
N
∑N
n=1 ESB [n]
[
log2 det
(
INB +
HB [n]Pu[n](HB [n])
H
δ2
)]
for
clarity. Referring to the remarkable studies in [41], [44], the
closed form of fB,u(Φs,Φa) could be expressed as
fB,u(Φs,Φa)
≈
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
log2 det
(
IL +
NBQB [n]Pu[n]QB [n]
δ2wB,u[n]
)
+NB
[
log2(wB,u[n])− log2 e
(
1−
1
wB,u[n]
)]]
,y
(
Φs,Φa,wB,u
)
,
(40)
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where wB,u = {wB,u[n] ≥ 1, ∀n}, and wB,u[n] can be
uniquely determined by the following fixed-point equation
wB,u[n] = 1 +
L∑
l=1
pul [n]Q
−1
B,l[n]
δ2 +NBpul [n]
(
QB,l[n]wB,u[n]
)−1 .
(41)
Note that y
(
Φs,Φa,wB,u
)
is a quite accurate form of
fB,u(Φs,Φa) [41]. However, y
(
Φs,Φa,wB,u
)
is still in-
tractable since wB,u[n] involves the variable p
u
l [n]. By in-
troducing tB,u = {tB,u[n], ∀n} and specifying wB,u[n] =
etB,u[n], ∀n, we have
y˜
(
Φs,Φa, tB,u
)
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
log2 det
(
IL +
NBQB [n]Pu[n]QB [n]
δ2etB,u[n]
)
+NB log2 e
(
tB,u[n]− 1 + e
−tB,u[n]
)]
,
(42)
where tB,u ≥ 0 and etB,u[n] needs to satisfy (41).
Based on (42), the partial derivation of y˜
(
Φs,Φa, tB,u
)
with respect to tB,u can be expressed as
∂y˜
(
Φs,Φa, tB,u
)
∂tB,u[n]
=−
NB
N ln 2
N∑
n=1
[
L∑
l=1
pul [n]
(
QB,l[n]e
tB,u[n]
)−1
δ2 +NBpul [n]
(
QB,l[n]etB,u[n]
)−1
− 1 + e−tB,u[n]
]
,∀n.
(43)
Let s(tB,u[n]) =
∑L
l=1
pul [n]
(
QB,l[n]e
tB,u[n]
)
−1
δ2+NBpul [n]
(
QB,l[n]e
tB,u[n]
)
−1 − 1+
e−tB,u[n]. Thus, we have
∂y˜
(
Φs,Φa, tB,u
)
∂tB,u[n]


< 0, s(tB,u[n]) > 0,
= 0, s(tB,u[n]) = 0,
> 0, s(tB,u[n]) < 0.
(44)
Denote s(tB,u) =
[
s(tB,u[1]), · · · , s(tB,u[N ])
]T
. It can be
observed from (44) that y˜
(
Φs,Φa, tB,u
)
is monotonically de-
creasing when s(tB,u) > 0, y˜
(
Φs,Φa, tB,u
)
is monotonically
increasing when s(tB,u) < 0, and y˜
(
Φs,Φa, tB,u
)
achieves
the extreme minimum point when s(tB,u) = 0. That is, when
tB,u increases from 0 to infinity, the function y˜
(
Φs,Φa, tB,u
)
would first decrease and then increase.
In addition, it can be derived from (44) that
∂2y˜
(
Φs,Φa, tB,u
)
∂t2B,u[n]
=
NB
N ln 2
N∑
n=1
[
L∑
l=1
δ2pul [n]Q
−1
B,l[n]e
tB,u[n](
δ2etB,u[n] +NBpul [n]Q
−1
B,l[n]
)2 + e−tB,u[n]
]
>0.
(45)
Therefore, we can obtain that
∂2y˜
(
Φs,Φa, tB,u
)
∂t2B,u
=
[
∂2y˜
(
Φs,Φa, tB,u
)
∂t2B,u[1]
, · · · ,
∂2y˜
(
Φs,Φa, tB,u
)
∂t2B,u[N ]
]T
≥ 0,
(46)
which indicates that y˜
(
Φs,Φa, tB,u
)
is convex in terms of
tB,u.
With the above discussions from (44) to (46), we can
conclude that the function y˜
(
Φs,Φa, tB,u
)
would achieve the
minimum value if and only if tB,u satisfies the following
equation
L∑
l=1
pul [n]
(
QB,l[n]e
tB,u[n]
)−1
δ2 +NBpul [n]
(
QB,l[n]etB,u[n]
)−1−1+e−tB,u[n] = 0, ∀n.
(47)
Comparing (41) and (47), it can be observed that
when tB,u satisfys the fixed-point equation, the function
y
(
Φs,Φa,wB,u
)
would be minimized. Therefore, we have
y
(
Φs,Φa,wB,u
)
= min
tB,u≥0
y˜
(
Φs,Φa, tB,u
)
. (48)
Finally, we generalize the aforementioned derivation to the
other three terms in (19), and then complete the proof.
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